Robbie Regression?

is the best player in New York. He knows it, you know it, I know it. This wasn’t always the case. An issue of perception as much as anything else, this mantel was held for a time by , then perhaps by for a much shorter time. But now it’s Cano’s. No position player has been more valuable to the Yankees over the past three seasons and as he enters his age-29 season, no player figures to be more valuable going forward. Not Rodriguez, not Teixeira, not , though he was probably better last year, and certainly not any other hitter on the big league roster. With no one in the minor league system primed to steal the spotlight, no major offensive acquisitions on the horizon, this is Robison Cano’s team as much as it is ‘s in the earlier part of this decade.

Recently 29, a second baseman, a career .308 hitter, a 30-homer threat, a fixture in the middle of the lineup of late, Cano is everything you would want in a franchise player. The effort issues of years past, most notably 2008, are largely gone. The skill set has consolidated. The value is enormous. Soon, the contract will be enormous too. Cano has a year left on his current deal, a team option for 2013. Given the Yankees policy regarding contract extensions, things could get ugly, but the overwhelming probability is that Cano will be a Yankee in 2014, and that he will have a $100+ million extension under his belt, keeping him in New York for the rest of his career. Yet despite the immense importance of Cano to this team, little analysis of his stat line seems needed. He’s a dependable, great, young, complete player. If anything it’s his defense that gets the most attention.

Last year was an excellent follow-up on a breakout season for Cano. Yet that elegant swing, that awesome offensive production, hides beneath the surface an interesting evolution of offensive skill. Despite finishing sixth in MVP voting and having an all around incredible year, setting career highs in runs scored and RBI and stolen bases and hitting fourth in the lineup for the first time in his career, Cano’s skills appeared to erode in several important categories. After the massive breakout that was 2010, some regression was to be expected. But while the power remained in place, the core offensive profile continued to change, not entirely for the better. Cano’s batting average and on base percentages fell to their lowest level, with the exception of 2008, since his rookie season. Yet his overall production remained at a level far beyond that of his pre-2010 lines. The change in approach appears to have contributed to increased power and increased value, but what are the long term implications? Should we be worried?

On the surface, no. Despite the drop in batting average and on base percentage, Cano’s power reached new heights. His isolated power of .234 last season topped even his ISO from the season before. He chipped in a career high 81 extra base hits. By all accounts, his defense remained a constant, well above average by some metrics, slightly below average by others, but generally not a major factor in his value. His wOBA fell – from .389 to .375 – but the latter remains a career high outside of 2010. Also a career high outside of 2010? His fWAR of 5.6, less than a win removed from his 2010 fWAR and 13th highest in the American League. Beyond that, if defensive runs saved is used rather than ultimate zone rating to determine Cano’s value, his WAR shoots up to about 6.5. That matches his 2010 production and puts him even with the likes of Adrian Gonzalez and Evan Longoria.

But the low batting average, the high number of outs, were not simply a matter of random variance. Cano struck out 14.1% of the time last season, by far a career high. He made contact 86.5% of the time, a career low. His 7.1% swinging strike rate tied a career high. Perhaps more interesting? What happened when Cano did make contact. At odds with the increased power production, Cano’s flyball rate fell to levels perviously seen in 2005-2007. He hit substantially more groundballs. He was far less patient. After slowly trending upwards, his BB% plummeted last season from 8.2% to 5.6%. He swung at nearly 42% of balls outside of the zone, a career high by 5 points. While his contact percentage on strikes – and on balls – remained fairly steady, he was simply not selective enough. He picked more balls, and he was burned.

It’s important to note some career trends at this point. Robinson Cano is a very unique player, and his career has been one of interesting evolution. He broke into the big leagues as a hitter with a great eye who absolutely never walked. If that doesn’t make any sense to you, you probably haven’t seen much of Robinson Cano. Willing to work counts, foul balls off, but ultimately too keen to hit on occasion. He waked 2.9% of the time as a rookie. His career, up to last season, was one of increasing patience, increasing willingness to take a walk, increasing selectivity. His BB/K rose each season, with the anomaly being 2007, between his rookie year and 2010. With this selectivity came power. He picked his pitches and let that sweet left handed swing, that natural loft, do the work for him.

Last season was a major deviation. Cano walked much less, he swung at far too many pitches outside the zone, he made far less contact, and when he did put the ball in play it resulted in far fewer flyballs. And so we are left with the strangest of situations – a player who was far more agressive, far less selective, who didn’t allow the natural loft in his swing to do the work, who didn’t wait for his pitch, who was unwilling to take a walk, but yet a player who’s value was fairly dependent on a string of extra base hits and home runs, the mark of the patient, selective power hitter. While hitting fewer fylballs, while squaring up fewer pitches, while ultimately presenting with a much less refined approach at the plate, a greater percentage of those balls he did hit into play turned into the very valuable double, triple, or home run. Cano hit for more power but by all underlying measure, he should have hit for less. His overall offensive production stayed at near-2010 levels, but his approach was fundamentally flawed, more reminiscent of the agressive, inpatient hitter who came to the big leagues in 2005.

Am I nitpicking? Maybe. Even Cano’s skill set from last season was extremely valuable. The strikeouts were more, but certainly not plentiful. His walk rate was still higher than in years past. His power was tremendous. But I can’t help but worry. The predicted regression from 2010, the regression that on the surface was quite minor, happened – just not in the way most of us suspected. And now we’re left not with a player of more modest power, or a player who’s batting average or home runs on balls in play is a little less, but a player with fundamentally flawed and less valuable approach and a dichotomy between results and expected results. We’re left with a player who, should the power numbers normalize, should the extra base hits happen at a more reasonable pace, would lag behind his pre-2010 value, and who is less than 24-months from a pay day. And there is precedent for a Cano collapse in his own past. Why the change in approach? Robinson Cano seems, to put it delicately, habitually lazy. When things are going good, things are going great, but eventually he falls back into bad habits.

What I’m saying is that this change in approach from last season is not the reason for Cano’s increase in power. If anything, his more selective approach from 2005-2010 was a greater factor, his physical maturity another component, and the new stadium a boon. What happened last season was an abandonment of much of the progress made in recent years, a change in approach not for the better, and something that should concern, to some degree, all Yankees fans. If that power does regress somewhat, there is danger. For the underlying foundation is not nearly as solid as it was a year ago. If those bad habits continue to resurface, we could be looking at a difficult situation in the next couple of years. Let’s all hope Cano, and Kevin Long, are working to make sure that does not happen.